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THE

DE~.;~OCRATIC

PAR 'TY ,&1\l!) FO:\EiGN POLICY

I presume that I am speaking to a group mads cp largely of Democrats.
In any event, I hope that I am.

I read somewhere that most of tb.e young people

in tb.e country think of thP.mselves as Democrats and I think that is a good thing
for the country.

I admit, however, to some bias in the matter,

We Democrats do b.ave the distinction of possessing the youngest member
of the Senate, Russell Long of Louisiana who is, I
we be

acc~.;sed

~elieve,

37 years o!dt

Lest

of being the captive of J'.merican youth as well as American

labor unions, however, let r:ne hc:.sten to add that we also have the distinction
of numbering in
Rhode Island.

o~r

ranko the c!tieFt member o.f the

Sen~te,

Theodore Green of

Senator Green a:!:nits to 89.

Since I am talking essentially to an a\ldience of Democrats and since I
have been asked to speak on

forei~n

policy, I have f'.lsed the two factors into

the subject of the Democratic Pa1·ty and Foreign Fc!icy.

Those of you >tl:o

veer towards the Republican party, if you have not reformed by the enci of my
talk, may still find the time not wasted.

You will at least have an inside track

on tile strategy of your opposition.
Any party in the opposition, when it c:.tterr.pts to deal

wi~h

questions o!

foreign policy fincls itself at a serious disadva.ntage in an election year.
choices are limited.

Its

!t can engage in a rl.;thles s partisanship, <!res sed up with

the slogans and salt.smans:·d p of Madison

Aven~e

in the hope of making votes.
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Or it can cn:"Jagc in a 'h.c-!oism" in the e.xpcctaticn that it "'-ill get cred1t and
votes for the achievements

whic~1

have been made cndcr the adminietrnt1on of

the majon!y pa:-ty.
Some me:::nbe1·o of the Republican party h<\\'e dor.t:: both in the past.

1'hcy

have engage:! in "me-toism" when a democratic admi:listration was lcadinc
the nation safely through the greatest war in history and through the ternble
...:haoo of the early postwar years.

When the &oing became tougb abroad and

after Mr. Dewey's defeat i-r. 1948 for the
shi.Lted.

'Ji-'

Repu~!icans

at home, tho tactks

They became increasingly ru:Meas c:.nd increasiagly irreoponsiblc.

I

~ cu~iminatcd

in the unbelieval:lc

distortio~s.

t.':e disre;>utable innuenclocs

I hopn t':.at the Democratic Party i-r. 1956 wili

accp~

n'3ither the alternative

of "mc-toism" or acquiescence in the misconcuct cf fo1·cign policy by the
Republican Administration or the
ia a third way.

of rut1:less irresponsilJility.

The way of :.r:eoj'.:,nsible opposition.

which the Democratic Party
three years both

a!tern~tivc

w~en

ha~

There

It is t!\e way, I b'!l!cvc

sought to pu!'suc in Congress dm·ing the past

we have been in a minc::-ity anc

~n

a majority in both

houoes of Congress .
I prefer the

:~r:n resp::-.:-.si~!e oppos!~ion

almost
bipartisan has been abused/beyond recognition.
foreinn relJ.tions,

h~artisr.nship.

The word

Responsible opposition in

as I sec it, mcano s:.mp!·; exercising t~e restraints of goot!

citi::e=tahip in matters which affect tl-.c
with oilier nations.

to

natio~'s

vital

in~erests

when we ceal

It mca~s avoi•.Ung t.~e ternp!c:~ion to seck political cz.pital

out of difficulties in forcigr:. rr;!ations.

-3It does not mean, however, an Gnd to criticism and debate of foreign

policy.
and all

On the contrary, it means the most vigorous
iss~es

which arise in the foreign field.

p~blic

discussion of any

It means an unremitting and

unfa-ltering search for facta ar.d ideas which can guide us in dealing with our
problems abroad.
Responsible criticism is :nore than a right of
also an obligation under o•n system of government,

t.~e

OFposition.

Foreign policy is to a

large extent made and carried ou! by the Executi.re !3ranch.
the indispensable in.lance.

We cannot

rema~.n

It is

But Congress is

sHcn! for the sake of a :nis-

under stood by-partisanship if the Executive Branch ca1·ries out policies which
in our responsible judgment are net in the best interests of the nation.
VI e cannot aban:lt:.n a free and cor:tir:.•..1ous scai·ch

fo~

improvement

in the conduct of foreign affaii"s anymore than in domestic a!.:cd.rs without
dest::oying the essence of America's greatness,
ever, we cannot permit political interest rather

Ey the same tcken, low ..
thar~

national interest to

motivate the search without urdcrmining the future of the country.

To a

considerable extent political interest did dominate the opposition d•Jring the
last Democratic Administration and it accounts in part for the serious predicament in which we now find ourselves in our relations with other nations .
There is a school c! thought whicn ho:cs that it is tl1e business of
political parties to get votes.

Having been elected to office on a number of

occasions, sometimes by margins too c;.ose fer comfort, I could not be mo:;.·e
in agreement with that

ccnr.~pt.

But w!-.atever its b:Ja!.ness, the purpose of a
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political party, v hcU.cr in

majorit)~

or a minonty,

Dcmocra~ic

Party so lor.g as it

l:n~

to

l ha \ c no fear

interests of the people of the U:r.itP-d St.1.tes .
the

1

crvc tl c
for the future of

e i .. s prirn .. ry conc,..rn the ullcl·cst

of tlte American people,
Within thet framewori<, there is a vast field for the responsible oppo ition to ex crcisc its critical facdties and its creative ability in foreign rcl. tion ,
in thie election year no
ir;nore that framework.
without doing

se1·~ous

our own party.

l~ss

than in any other year.

We cannot, howc\'cr,

We cannot abandon tile restraints cf good c:.tizenslup

anJ. therefore, in t!H! long run, to

damage to the nat;on

At no other tin1e in our history has ti1cre been a greater need

for vision, boldness, and positive actiOJ' in America:1 !orcign policy than today.
In the past few rnc.n ...hs I \ is:ted some of the prol:.lcm areas of t:'lc W<.1rl<l,
I was in Sou\.hcast Asia.

In addition, I traveled extens ivc!y in Europe and

North Africa. I te~l you frankly I am dist'Jrued .0? thl! 't>,ntnrHi:;~ tr~nds:: in nu
world affa ' r<~.
But I an' disturbed evcn morc by th fa1lurc of our
Gt:fvtn'l'i mf•ut to cnunte r::.ct' thC' ~ ~ "~ o m1:noulf tr ~nds.
4

The Soviet diplomatic offensive, dramatized at Geneva la st July, has
mad<.' great gains.

In man)' respects Soviet intentions were groao!y miscalculate,

l,1any took at face value the preachments of peaceful coexistence by Khrushchev
and Bulganin.
ber, the

The failure of the Geneva Fo ... eign .l\iinistcrs' Conference in Octo-

\·enturou~

thrust or S(J\ie.t Russia ir.tn ti1e Mitldl::! East, and the equally

bold Soviet thrust into Southeast Asia e>:cmpli:ficci by the tra vel s of Messrs.
Khrushche\• and Bulgadn, hc:.vc had a
too-optimistic

it~

the Administratior..

so';~ri:lg

;:..!feet \.lpon the minds of the a!l-

'I he experience of !l1c past few months

-5suggests that the "Geneva Spirit"

generat2d by the Soviet Union las t July

seems to have been a purposeful tactic to reduce Western vigilance and to
soften the neutral al'eas in preparation :or a determined Soviet diplomatic
effort at penetration.
The Soviet Union appears to be succeeding in this effort, at least for
the present.

The Western Allies and the Administration here at home , are

cutting armaments even before agreements on disarmament have been
achieved.

Communist arms and muniti ons are pcuring into Egy?t while,

simultanoou9ly Soviet economic influence is penetrating the Middle East.
Messrs l<t.;. tshchev aud
Union have

bla~ed

Bul~anin ,

the travelling salesmen of the Soviet

a trail of success from Afghanistan through India to Burma

and back.

,.
These Soviet successes are disturbing in themsel.ves.

More disturbing

however, is the fact that when taken togethc1· they represent a massive gain in
the momentum of Soviet diplomacy.

Despite bold terms

lil~o

"massive

retaliation", this Soviet diplomatic offensive has been met with noL"Ung but a
"massive inertia".
of the President.

Some of the fault I realize lies in the unfortunate illncs s
That is not, however , i.n my judgment the principal reason

fo't our difficul ty.
I think what is happening-- why we are approaching a deaJ end in forejgn
relations -- is this .

The United States, beginning with the containment policy

in 1947-48 gradually put tcgethe1· a dur"'ble fo1·e:ign policy with wilich to curb
the danger to freedom represe!ltcd by commur.ist totaHtarianism .

!twas

-b-

built by the cooperation of bo h parhe
wa

under a Dcmocr he Admun tr uon.

compounded of ne.v and bold idc... s and concept .

wtlh vigor and by crent dedication to duty.

It w

lt

earned out

The h l'lts of t."la.t e!Cort '"'ere to b

seen in the great structures of peace end dcfen e vhich were standing when
the prcocnt Adminiotration cntcreci Wa shington.

Despite much clccuon

campaign oratory to the contrary v.hat had alrearl}' been constructed under
DemoCI·atic Adntinistration was not <lismantlcu

by the

uccessor Republic n

Aurniniotration.
Leaders were changed; the

Adtninist:·a~h·e

machinery was sc• erely

damaged , civil scr •ants were terrorized into inertia but lhc foreign policies
themselves were, in t \e main, continued.

They arc continued bccauoe

for the most part they wc.rc the best available answers to our problems.
Republicans forgot their promises of liberation of Eastern Europe.

The

They

coined some new ph r :\<>es and they "unleashed Chiang" but the world and our

w e.JJ"fforeign policies

w;rtt

on about

The fact is th:'lt foreign

th~

same as ever.

po~icy

can be no mo1e positive , no more

dynamic than the ideas of the people who make it,

And for

~

almost~

years

we have had dynamic and dangerous Republican words but no new Republican idcns ,
There is in the Department of State a poltcy planning staff whose principal
function is to gi,·e creative directions to our foreign policies.

So far as I

have been able to determine nola single new thought of any consequence has
c:omc out of that body in the past three years.
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-9We have reached a point after t}n·ee years when the energies inherent
in past policies are becoming exhausted.

That, I believe, more than any other

single factor, explains the mounting difficulties which are closing in on us abroa1
While the Russians have moved boialy and with determination in their
diplomacy, those responsible for foreign policy in this country have turned
their backs on new ideas which might lead to progrcs s and development in our
foreign relations.

In the past three years the Administration has, to a great

extent, reaped the harvest of the great and creative decisions of previous
administrations,
The Marshall Plan, the Point Four Program and others were bold
strokes in foreign policy.

They required positive action.

They required

also a willingness to entertain new and challenging ideas.
A final characteristic of foreign policy, under the pt·esent Administration
is that it is plagued by factionalism.

It is elementary that to have an

effective foreign policy there must first of all be a measute of unity,
especially unity in the party that holds the reins of government.

~

For~

years we have witnessed a spectacle of open and extreme factionalism.

During

the first two years, the new Administration pursued with great difficulty a
course of attempting to reconcile these irreconcilable factions.

Only with

the election of a Democratic Congress in 1954 was the President able to get
a measure of real support for the constructive aspects of his program in
foreign affairs.

II

Our need today

1

, 1 Hey that

for a fore•

r.onscicnce, a conscience that co rc

1

3rounded m

!or the v.ctrn '"'e of mankind

enough of pollcics of 1 iou~ plat:itut.lcs wl.1ch pro' id

nor 1
~

h~d

e h \c

nothtng bet an e c pe

from facing hard and unpleasant !acts.
We need a policy thal is rccepthc to new iccas, a policy tl1at i
afraid o£ new ideas.

n

t

The great actions for peace anrl rcconstructlon in he

postwar wor ld hnvc aow become eo commonly accepted lhat we often Io.il to
realize that they c.ontained bold, new ideas nevet before conceived in Asn<!rtC n
foreign policy.

New internationul situations are crowdinc in upon ns and we

must have a constant stream o1 new ideaa to deal wil.l1 them.
We need a policy of strength and positive action .

It needs to be made

with quiet co\•ragc ;u.d c!c:-cr:·nin.ttion not ·.vith loud \"Ords a:td empty promi cs.
And more thCln anything else, we need a foreign pollcy of freedom.
In th e spirit of

d~mocr~cy

<J.nd cnlightcnme:1t, we need

tt

policy that is not

the product of a sing l e rnan or which depends on a single man fol' its execution.
We need a policy that stems from the inspiration of the American people and
commands their cont1nuing cupport.
American foreign policy in short needs vision , coupled with persiotcncc.
For months tbe Administration has been at a loss to dea l with the new Soviet
challenge.

A'J far as nnyoue can determine, the Administration has no

thought-out immediate or long-range
meet this Soviet challcnr;e.
•be plan?

po~icy .

Declarations o!

!t has no practical plan to
in:~ntions

arc many, b\Jt where is
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A vacuum of thougl•t seems to h..1.ve settled upon the Administration,
and this vacuum threatens to seriously impair our interests as a nation.
Lethargy and indecision prevail where clear thinking is required; inaction
dominates where energy and drive are neeued.

The end result is:

Our

foreign policy is a policy without drive, a policy stricken with a poverty
of ideas.
The challenge to all of us, as Americans, is to r estore the drive and
to end the poverty.

\

\

